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Abstract: This paper traces the remarkable economic development that has occurred in  
East Asia in the post-war period and explains the role played by the region’s distinctive 
political practices and economic structures. The paper emphasises both the regional and 
wider geo-political contexts within which these developments occurred. Finally, the paper 
examines how deepening economic integration is encouraging greater political 
cooperation across the whole of East Asia. 
 
Introduction 
One of the most remarkable and surprising developments in the second half of the 
twentieth century was the economic transformation that occurred in parts of Asia. In 
Northeast Asia in particular, a process of industrialisation and rapid economic 
expansion took hold that gradually spread to other parts of the continent, leading some 
observers to describe the end result as nothing short of ‘miraculous’ (World Bank 
1993). At the outset, however, it is important to emphasise that ‘Asia’ is a strikingly 
diverse place, and that some parts – the central and Southern parts, for example – have 
not generally enjoyed the sort of economic growth rates that have attracted so much 
attention from the scholarly and policy-making communities. This essay, therefore, will 
focus on East Asia, which includes Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); for it was 
here that the conventional wisdom about the possibility of, and the preconditions for, 
economic development outside the ‘core’ industrialised economies of Western Europe 
and North America was fundamentally challenged. 
 
Economic development anywhere is constrained or encouraged by specific historical 
factors. Consequently, the first part of this essay briefly looks back at the circumstances 
in which the ‘East Asian miracle’ occurred. Although there were some potentially 
propitious circumstances in which development could take off, much depended on the 
efforts of East Asians themselves and the particular political relationships and economic 
structures they developed to accelerate the industrialisation process. No country played 
a bigger part in this than Japan, and I pay particular attention to both its emergence as 
the first industrialised nation in Asia, and to the role the ‘developmental state’ played in 
overseeing this economic transformation. Following this I detail how other countries 
have attempted to emulate the Japanese experience and the impact this more generalised 
process of industrialisation has had in integrating the region economically. 
Significantly, however, this growing economic integration has not been matched to the 
same extent at the political level: political integration in East Asia has – until recently, 
at least – been limited and not region-wide. The emergence of China as a major 
economic and political force in the region may accelerate regional integration at a 
number of levels. Yet even if it does, ‘East Asia’ is likely to be characterised by 
continuing variations in the levels of economic development and political influence 
enjoyed by the very different countries of the region, differences that may make 
political and economic integration more difficult than it has been in other parts of the 
world. 
 
The Historical Context of East Asian Development 
 
Given East Asia’s generally difficult initial integration into the emergent global political 
economy, its recent rapid growth is all the more remarkable. Two critical developments 
that had their origins in Western Europe – the emergence of capitalism and the 
consolidation of the nation-state – profoundly affected the course of development 
across the non-core countries, especially in the nineteenth century. The economic, 
political, social and strategic innovations that occurred in Europe gave Europeans a 
decisive edge over other centres of power, and allowed them to colonize much of the 
rest of the world as a consequence. In East Asia, the hierarchical regional order that had 
been centred on China, and which had existed in one form or another for hundreds, if 
not thousands of years, was suddenly overturned, and much of the region  was 
incorporated into the emergent global economy on highly unfavourable terms. 
European observers alike Karl Marx and Max Weber thought that the comparative 
underdevelopment and exploitation of East Asia was a consequence of moribund Asian 
cultural values. Paradoxically enough, ‘Asian values’ were recently considered to be 
integral to East Asia’s success (Ingleson 1996), which reminds us of how academic and 
political fashions can change. Recent ‘cultural’ explanations of East Asia’s rise – 
especially those developed by prominent regional politicians like Singapore’s Lee Kuan 
Yew and Malaysia’s Mahathir – have generally been  relativistic, self-serving and not 
terribly convincing (Rodan 1996). What we can say, however, is that prior to the often 
traumatic interaction with Europe, East Asia had already established itself as a major 
centre of economic activity. Indeed, it has been persuasively argued that Europe’s own 
economic development owed much to the earlier Asian success (Frank 1998). It is 
testimony to the generally negative impact of the colonial period that much of this early 
Asian developmental lead was decisively lost. 
 
Indeed, during the first half of the twentieth century there were few signs of the 
widespread economic renaissance to come. Only in Japan, was major industrialisation 
occurring. Unfortunately, much of this was driven by Japan’s emulation of European 
imperialism and militarism (see (Beasley 1987). As is well known, Japan’s imperial 
ambitions culminated in its defeat at the hands of the United States during World War 
II, and a preoccupation with economic development and pacifism in the war’s 
aftermath. What is less well understood is that Japan’s quite remarkable economic 
development, in which it was transformed from war-time devastation to the second 
largest economy in the world in little more than three decades, could not have happened 
without a favourable geopolitical environment and the influence of American 
hegemony. Indeed, for those East Asian countries fortunate enough to be on the ‘right’ 
side of the Cold War, American interventions in Korea and Vietnam proved to be 
important spurs to the course of economic expansion (Stubbs 1999). 
 
The US had emerged from World War II as the most powerful country in the world, but 
one that found itself locked in a Manichean struggle with the Soviet Union – then a 
formidable adversary. In such circumstances, the US cultivated Japan as a key ally and 
potential bulwark against Soviet expansion in Asia (Schaller 1982). Not only did Japan 
receive aid and investment from the US as a consequence – something that facilitated 
reconstruction and development - but the Americans were prepared to tolerate Japan’s 
mercantilist trade and industry policies if they ensured its survival as a successful 
capitalist state. Consequently, the ‘developmental state’ that had emerged before the 
war was largely left in place to oversee post-war reconstruction and development 
(Johnson 1982). The central component of the developmental state, which has been 
widely emulated with varying degrees of success across East Asia, was a competent 
bureaucracy with close ties to domestic business; a bureaucracy which had the desire 
and the capacity to plan the course of economic development. 
 
So important have the Japanese developmental example and latterly Japanese trade and 
investment links across the region been, that it is worth highlighting a number of key 
features of the Japanese experience. It is important to stress that the Japanese model was 
- and to a lesser extent, still is – fundamentally at odds with many of the ideas now 
associated with neoliberalism. The sort of industry policies and trade protectionism 
practised by Japan were reminiscent of the sorts of policies employed, but now largely 
forgotten, by Britain and the US during their own industrialisation phases (Chang 
2002). Not only was the Japanese developmental state highly successful for many years, 
but it institutionalised a distinctive set of relationships between states and markets that 
have become characteristic of much of East Asia (Wade 1990). Even when Japanese 
companies began to move offshore from the 1960s and ’70s as the cost of Japanese 
labour and the value of the yen rose, their expansion was overseen and facilitated by the 
state (Hatch & Yamamura 1996). Ironically enough, Japan has come to exercise a sort 
of ‘hegemonic’ influence, albeit an understated one (Beeson 2001b), that the former 
imperial powers who colonised most of Southeast Asia did in the nineteenth century. 
To see why, we need to differentiate more clearly between South and Northeast Asia. 
 
There are a number of important, and broadly generalisable differences between the 
countries of Northeast and Southeast Asia. Some of the most important of these are 
historical. First, Northeast Asia was not as deeply affected by European colonisation as 
the South. Not only did Japan escape colonisation, but Korea and Taiwan were actually 
colonised by the Japanese, something that helped to integrate the Northeast Asian 
nations economically, and which provided a direct lesson in Japanese-style state-led 
development (Cumings 1984). Northeast Asia generally was able to exploit the 
advantages of ‘late’ development, emulating economic strategies and ‘borrowing’ the 
technologies that had proved successful elsewhere (Gerschenkron 1966). The second 
key point to make about Northeast Asia is that it industrialised early – at least within a 
regional context. This meant that Japan and its acolytes in Korea, Taiwan and to a lesser 
extent Singapore, were able to integrate themselves into the global economy at a 
favourable moment, and establish advantageous positions within the emerging regional 
economy. In Southeast Asia, by contrast, not only were the general global conditions 
less auspicious by the 1970s and ’80s when these later developers were taking off, but 
they also had to compete with their established Northeast Asian neighbours (Beeson 
2002).  
 
A third distinction between North and Southeast Asia is in their respective ‘state 
capacities’ (Polidano 2000). Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Southeast Asian 
anomaly, Singapore, had relatively competent and honest bureaucracies. In such 
circumstances, the state generally enjoyed an ability to devise and implement policies 
designed to further the ‘national interest’ generally and accelerate economic 
development in particular. In Southeast Asia, by contrast, the state has generally not 
enjoyed the same sort of capacity to implement policy in the sort of relatively 
autonomous manner that Peter Evans (1995) suggests is an essential element of 
successful state-led development. On the contrary, the state has frequently been 
‘captured’ by vested interests, as in the Philippines (Hutchcroft 1998), or become the 
centre of elaborate networks of patronage and influence, as in Indonesia (Winter 1996). 
Even in Malaysia the state is dominated by political interests that have close ties to 
business or political parties that are major shareholders in key industries (Gomez & 
Jomo 1997). In such circumstances, the line between the political and economic spheres 
has become blurred at best, meaningless at worst.  
 
This is not to suggest that relatively successful economic development has not occurred 
in Southeast Asia, or that Southeast Asian states have not successfully employed the 
sorts of industry policies that were deployed so effectively in the North. On the 
contrary, they have (Jomo 2001). What we do need to emphasise though, is that 
political and economic processes are deeply integrated, and the legitimacy of the state is 
highly dependent on its ability to deliver continuing economic development. Yet a 
number of factors that are frequently well beyond ability of the less powerful Southeast 
Asian countries to manage, threaten to fundamentally undermine state capacity and 
legitimacy. 
 
Regional Political Economy 
 
One important consequence that flows from the timing of the industrialisation process 
has been the development of a regional production hierarchy. Because Japan went first, 
and was followed initially by Taiwan, Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong, and then later 
by the countries of Southeast Asia, a multi-tier division of labour has emerged across 
the region. The most positive interpretation of this evolving production hierarchy has 
been the ‘flying geese theory’, an idea assiduously promoted by a number of Japanese 
economists and public officials. In essence, the flying geese model suggests that Japan, 
as the ‘lead goose’ industrialised first, providing a crucial stimulus for region-wide 
economic development in which the Japanese model and its expanding economy would 
pull along other economies in its wake, allowing them to replicate Japanese success 
(Gangopadhyay 1998). 
 
Unfortunately, the reality has frequently been rather different. One problem has been 
that historically, Japanese multinationals- which have played a key role in establishing 
region-wide production structures – have often been reluctant to transfer technology 
and the more valuable parts of the production process to other countries and potential 
competitors (Bernard & Ravenhill 1995). As a consequence, a distinctive triangular 
relationship has developed between Japan, Southeast Asia and major consumer goods 
markets in the US in particular. Baldly put, Japan has supplied the money, the capital 
goods and the expertise, while Southeast Asia has supplied cheap labour, natural 
resources and an export platform from which to penetrate potentially protected markets. 
It is important to note that ‘East Asia’ generally and Japan in particular have been  
victims of their own success in this regard: one major consequence of the rapid 
development of competitive manufacturing industries across the region has been the 
growth of politically sensitive trade surpluses, especially with the US. Throughout the 
1980s in particular US-Japan relations were strained by interminable, frequently 
acrimonious trade negotiations as the US sought to use its political power to achieve 
economic goals (Schoppa 1997). Export platforms in Southeast Asia offered Japanese 
multinationals a way of reducing costs and circumventing protectionist pressures. 
Ironically, the so-called ‘Plaza Accord’ in which America pressured Japan to revalue its 
currency actually helped accelerate this process and did little to rectify the trade deficit 
(Brenner 1998). 
 
Recent events and the nature of the production process itself have begun to undermine 
this rather crudely drawn picture of the East Asian region. On the one hand, the very 
nature of sophisticated manufacturing processes in hi-tech electronics is forcing 
Japanese multinationals to open up their production networks and encouraging 
technology and skill transfer. On the other hand, American firms have responded to 
international competitive pressures to improve productivity and re-establish themselves 
as rivals to the Japanese in Southeast Asia (Borrus 2000; Hsiao, Hsiao, & Yamashita 
2003). Nevertheless, the idea of a regional hierarchy with Japan at its apex, the second 
tier countries of Korea and Taiwan not far behind, and with most of Southeast Asia 
bringing up the rear remains broadly true. Even if we allow for significant differences 
between say Malaysia and Vietnam in terms of living standards and industrial 
sophistication, there is an even larger gap between them and Japan or even Korea. 
 
There is however, one factor that threatens to overturn all of the above: China. The 
sheer scale of China’s population and economic potential has generated a good deal of 
hyperbole and fevered speculation. Although some of the claims about the inevitability 
of China’s rise may be overstated (Segal 1999), it is clear that – especially in a regional 
context – China is going to have a profound impact on its neighbours. Already China 
has become the largest recipient of inward foreign investment, something that may not 
only deprive its smaller neighbours in Southeast Asia of valuable capital inflows, but 
which will add to China’s already formidable industrial capacity (Economist 2002). In 
such circumstances, Southeast Asia risks being overwhelmed by the competitive 
pressures emanating from China as it competes in the same low-end manufacturing 
niches. Even Japan – still by far the largest economy in the region – is becoming 
increasingly reliant on China as a production site and as an export market.  
 
So rapid has China’s rise been since it embarked upon a process of economic 
liberalisation and ‘opening’ toward the global economy that it is hard to gauge what its 
ultimate significance is likely to be, for the region or the wider world. A number of 
points are worth noting, however. First, China’s transformation has occurred under 
terms and conditions that were largely determined by the dominant capitalist powers led 
by the US. China’s accession to the World Trade Organization  is emblematic of this 
reality (Fewsmith 2001), as China has been forced to embark on far-reaching 
constitutional and legal reforms to comply with the existent forms of global 
governance. The second point to make is that China has rapidly become as dependent 
on access to American markets as the other industrialising economies of East Asia were 
before it; in China’s case, however, its sheer size means that it has displaced Japan as 
the principal cause of American trade deficits. Predictably enough, pressure is mounting 
on China to ‘fix’ the problem by liberalising its currency and allowing it to appreciate. 
  
The merits of capital account liberalisation are somewhat ‘technical’ and – given the 
earlier Japanese experience – look unlikely to resolve the ‘problem’. Again, however, 
China’s situation highlights issues with more widespread ramifications.  
 
The Crisis and Its Aftermath 
 
In 1997 what began as a localised currency crisis in Thailand, rapidly spread across the 
much of Southeast Asia and Korea. The ‘Asian crisis’ raised major questions about the 
status and durability of the former ‘miracle’ economies. In the short term this was 
manifest in the massive outflows of capital that played such a large part in triggering 
and intensifying the crisis. In the longer term, the crisis has prompted a major re-think 
about the region and inspired an ideologically motivated discursive deconstruction of 
the Asian development model (Hall 2003). 
 
The crisis itself has been the subject of extensive commentary (Haggard 2000; Robison, 
Beeson, Jayasuriya, & Kim 2000), and there is no intention of repeating that here. 
However, the crisis was such a watershed in the region’s political economy that it is 
important to emphasise a number of key points. Perhaps the most obvious fact that the 
crisis highlighted was about the evolving nature of the region’s relationship with the 
rest of the world. At one level this was manifest in the extent to which those countries 
that were most badly affected by the crisis had become dependent on the rest of the 
world for continuing inflows of capital. Where this was in the form of foreign direct 
investment,  it was generally a welcome catalyst for further industrialisation. But 
Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea had all become increasingly addicted to highly 
mobile, short-term capital flows, which were generally used to fund consumer spending 
and speculative activities like property development. Once the idea of the ‘Asian 
miracle’ began unravel, and once doubts about the ability of governments to maintain 
the value of their currencies become widespread, then the preconditions for rapid capital 
flight were in place. Significantly, the close relationships between political and 
economic elites in the region that had formerly been seen as a sign of predictability and 
stability, were now widely blamed for all that was wrong with the region. 
 
While there may have been much about ‘crony capitalism’ - as East Asia’s distinctive 
political-economies came to be caricatured - that was corrupt and  inefficient, it  begs an 
obvious question: if crony capitalism was such a problem, why did the large 
institutional investors appear unconcerned about it prior to 1997, and why did 
institutions like the IMF  and the World Bank  lavish praise on the countries of the 
region as models of development success? Plainly, this was partly a consequence of 
perceptions which flowed from the self-sustaining and misplaced euphoria that built up 
around a region associated with rapid development (and rapid returns for holders of 
mobile financial assets). While there may have been grounds for concern about the 
basis and sustainability of ‘miraculous’ growth rates (Krugman 1994), we should also 
not lose sight of the fact that very real, unparalleled increases in living standards were – 
and still are – being achieved access much of the region. True, Indonesia has struggled 
to regain its former position, but China’s development alone is transforming global 
development indicators. 
 
If the rest of the world’s reaction to East Asian development prospects both before and 
after the crisis was frequently overdone, this only highlighted a more enduring point: as 
East Asian economies integrated more closely with the global political economy they 
were increasingly exposed to both its benefits and dangers. True, East Asian economies 
could tap the enormous pools of investment capital controlled by major mutual funds in 
places like the US, but the price for this was exposing themselves to the judgement and 
power of highly mobile international capital. Capital flight, and violent, destabilising  
exchange rate movements, were the risk regional governments faced, especially in the 
still small economies of Southeast Asia, which are dwarfed by daily financial capital 
movements. Even more importantly in the longer term, perhaps, powerful external 
actors like the IMF and the US immediately recognised the crisis offered a possibly 
once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to compel Asian states to adopt reforms associated with 
neoliberalism, reforms which had been studiously resisted in most of East Asia (Bello 
1998). 
 
The attempt by external agencies to impose a new regional order that was at odds with 
the political practices and economic structures which had distinguished the region and 
underpinned its economic development was widely resented (Higgott 1998). In the 
longer-term, such actions had the effect of making East Asians aware of their exposure 
to extra-regional political and economic forces over which they had little control. 
Consequently, American intervention and the role of the intentional financial 
institutions has actually had the paradoxical and unintended consequence of 
encouraging greater regional cooperation and a push for greater independence of action 
– especially from the US (Beeson 2003a; Bowles 2002). Whether greater regional 
cooperation and institutionalisation, especially along the lines of European Union (EU) 
can be achieved is, however, a moot point. 
 
While economic integration may have been proceeding apace in East Asia, and is 
largely driven by the activities of the private sector, a similar degree of political 
integration has been much harder to achieve. The only indigenous long-standing 
regional institution is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which – as 
the name suggests is confined to Southeast Asia. Even here, ASEAN is not comparable 
with the EU, either in terms of political integration, or in the extent and sophistication 
of the region-wide institutions that have developed to manage transnational relations 
(Beeson 2001a).  On the contrary, part of ASEAN’s underlying rationale has been to 
provide a mechanism to protect, rather pool sovereignty as the EU does. Consequently, 
ASEAN has a comparatively tiny secretariat with little power to ensure member 
compliance with regional agreements. Indeed, non-‘interference’ in the affairs of other 
member states has been a fundamental part of the ‘ASEAN way’ of doing things – a 
modus operandi that stresses consensus and informality, rather than the sort of legalism 
that characterises similar regional agreements in Western Europe and North America 
(Acharya 2001; Kahler 2000). 
 
The preoccupation with maintaining independence and freedom of action has been a 
particular concern of Southeast Asian states, which are often comparatively new, 
insecure, authoritarian and keen to protect the sorts of close relations between political 
and economic elites that are so distinctive of the region as a whole. In such 
circumstances, it is unsurprising that they have had difficulties in establishing effective 
regional economic agreements. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), for example, is 
designed to encourage greater economic integration in Southeast Asia, a region that has 
conspicuously low levels of intra-regional trade. But the competitive nature of regional 
economies and the sensitivity of key domestic industries has made agreement and 
implementation difficult. There are, however, signs that the integration of the region 
into the wider global political economy is exerting long-term changes in the domestic 
balance of political forces across the region (Stubbs 2000), and helping to overcome the 
institutionalised patterns of political-economic relations that grew up around protected 
economies (Jayasuriya 2003). Continuing liberalisation of the ‘real’ economy in the 
region may be inevitable in such circumstances. Whether there will be similar 
enthusiasm for continuing liberalisation in the financial sector is less clear. What we 
can say, is that reform initiatives in the financial sector cooperation are at the centre of 
efforts to expand regional cooperation to include the major economies of Northeast 
Asia. 
 
Cooperation in the financial sector is not as surprising as it may seem. After all, the 
crisis demonstrated how vulnerable the region was to rapid flows of capital, and the 
region has some of the largest foreign exchange reserves in the world. East Asia has 
generally been associated with high domestic savings rates and the capacity of countries 
like Japan to fund its own development gave it significant economic autonomy.  The 
formidable foreign exchange holdings of Japan and China have been further boosted of 
late as both countries effectively fund America’s trade and budget deficits by buying 
America dollars and debt (Economist 2004). In short, the countries of East Asia have 
the collective economic wherewithal to make the region generally more economically 
independent and to impose a more tightly regulated  financial structure if they choose to 
do so (Dieter & Higgott 2003). Formidable technical problems,  the limited capacity a 
number of the region’s less developed economies to implement regulatory reform, and 
an uneasiness on the part of China and Japan about providing an open-ended 
commitment to some of their impecunious neighbours have placed limits on the degree 
of cooperation achieved thus far, however (Ravenhill 2002). Moreover, the capacity of 
American based financial sector interests in ‘Wall Street’ to influence the international 
policy-making and regulatory environment through their links to the US government, 
and the financial sector’s ability to continue promoting greater liberalisation across the 
rest of the world despite major concerns about the stability of global financial structures 
as a whole, means that establishing a different or more regulated East Asian system 
remains a major challenge (Beeson 2003b). 
 
Nevertheless, despite a number of obstacles, the move toward greater regional 
cooperation across the wider East Asian region continues to gather momentum. The 
most important manifestation of this trend has been the development of ‘ASEAN + 3’ 
which, in addition to the original members of ASEAN from Southeast Asia, also 
includes the significantly larger economies of South Korea, China and Japan. 
Significantly, the first informal ASEAN + 3 summit occurred in late 1997 – shortly 
after the financial crisis hit the region. The grouping has quickly become a prominent 
part of regional relations and has become increasingly institutionalised in the process 
(Thomas 2002). Given the East Asian region’s frequently bloody history, the major 
differences that exist in levels of economic and political development, and ASEAN’s 
modest record of achievement, there is understandably a good deal of  scepticism about 
its prospects.(Hund 2003). However, some of those very historical experiences that 
critics cite may actually provide some sense of nascent regional identity and common 
outlook (Stubbs 2002). At the very least we need to remember that the prospect of 
cooperation between France and Germany looked fairly remote in the late 1940s, but 
they rapidly became the central pillars of the EU - a similar rapprochement between 
Japan and China is hardly such an outlandish idea. Indeed, despite lingering suspicions 
that stem from their bloody war-time confrontation, the competition for regional 
leadership between Japan and China may actually be accelerating the process of 
regional integration as both counties attempt to shore up their positions by establishing 
closer ties with ASEAN in particular (Beeson 2004). 
 
One of the most important influences over the course of East Asia’s future integration – 
especially at the political level – will come from outside the region: American foreign 
policy will continue to play a major role in constraining or facilitating regional 
outcomes.  In some ways this echoes the earlier European experience, but it is important 
to recognise that strategic issues are not as critical – the current ‘war on terror’ 
notwithstanding – as they were at the height of the Cold War. Trying to predict just how 
US foreign policy might develop and what impact this may have on the region is clearly 
a foolhardy undertaking. However, it is revealing that American opposition to East 
Asian regionalism has diminished and this may prove especially significant. When 
Malaysian Prime Minister  Mahathir proposed a similar East Asian grouping in the 
early 1990s – the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) – his initiative was effectively 
vetoed by the US: American opposition was enough to ensure that Japan would have no 
part in it. In the intervening period, however, not only has Japanese foreign policy  
become a little more independent and imaginative, but there is a growing regional 
consensus about the need for some sort of institutionalised mechanism to manage 
specifically East Asian concerns (Terada 2003). 
 
As far as America’s influence on regional integration is concerned its impact is 
ambivalent: on the one hand, the re-emergence of security concerns in the region may 
create a more tolerant climate within which East Asian regional  integration can 
continue. The US may even be less doctrinaire in its approach to economic issues and 
more tolerant of Asia’s distinctive forms of capitalism - as it was during the Cold War 
when strategic issues were pre-eminent. On the other hand, the US has displayed an 
increased willingness to explicitly link security and economic issues in an effort to 
secure compliance with its long-term geopolitical agenda and the ‘war on terror’: those 
nations that accede to the US’s security policy hope for, and generally receive, more 
favourable trade agreements than those that don’t (Higgott 2003).  
 
If the US continues to pursue its present bilateral rather than multilateral approach to 
international relationships and agreements this will make life difficult for regional 
institutions that are designed to promote greater regional cooperation. It is likely to 
prove particularly difficult for those regional institutions like the Asia Pacific Economic  
Cooperation forum (APEC),  which are designed to promote trade liberalisation through 
multilateral auspices. Not only have such issues slid down the regional agenda, but 
inter-, as opposed to intra-regional relations seem to be less important. Indeed, the very 
idea of an wider ‘Asia-Pacific’ region, which tied both sides of the Pacific together 
through increased political cooperation, looks a less likely prospect in the current 
environment. In such circumstances, a more tightly focused East Asian grouping may 
come to seem like an  increasingly attractive and  - in the absence of other alternatives – 
functionally necessary institution in an increasingly inter-linked region. 
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